This paper offers preliminary reflections on the relationship between the seemingly opposed logics of white supremacy and racial liberalism by sketching the contours and workings of what the authors call technoliberalism. First, the article briefly overviews the relationship between the discourse of "white loss," immigration and automation in contemporary US national politics. It then addresses how technoliberal imaginaries that argue that it is robots, not racialized others, who are taking US jobs, pin their anti-racist logics on a postracial technological future. Through examples of robotic and digital technologies intended to replace human bodies and functions, the paper thus excavates the suppressed racial imaginary "technoliberalism."
Atanasoski and Vora
Automated teaching and learning characterizes the new generation of factory robots. This is a central aspect of what the World Economic Forum has recently dubbed the "fourth industrial revolution," in which even the production and programming of technology can be performed by machines themselves. Even though the development of human-free industrial robots announces that an ostensibly post-labor (and as we will go on to argue in this paper, a "post-race" and "post-gender") epoch is upon us, the automation that was an inherent part of the first industrial revolution has signaled the threat of the replaceability of specific types of human functions and human workers that are racialized and gendered.
Following the 2016 US presidential election, for instance, the media announced that Donald Trump could not live up to his promises to return jobs to the white working class because these jobs were lost to robots rather than to threatening racial others (i.e., to illegal immigrants and racialized outsourced labor in the Global South). Nonetheless, the machine and the racialized other pose a similar threat of displacing those already fully human in this conception of (white) loss.
In this paper, we offer preliminary reflections on the relationship between the seemingly opposed logics of white supremacy and racial liberalism by sketching the contours and workings of what we call technoliberalism that is a part of the so-called fourth industrial revolution.
We begin by briefly overviewing the relationship between the discourse of "white loss," immigration and automation in contemporary US national politics. We then move to addressing how technoliberal imaginaries that argue that it is robots, not racialized others, who are taking US jobs, pin their anti-racist logics on a post-racial technological future. We see in this spoof of the border wall an argument that closing the border increases the need for automation (even as the inefficiency of the automated border system frustrates the violently expelled workers).
We will return to how this video is a critique of both the white supremacist and technoliberal imaginaries of the US economy at the end of this essay. The racial imaginary Trump invokes, both in his campaign rhetoric and in his presidential speeches, has led many scholars of race in the US to question whether we must now think about fascism rather than
liberalism if we want to analyze race relations (we need only to think of the recent events in Charlottesville VA to understand why this seems to be an important move). Briefly, racial liberalism has long been viewed as a central tenet of governance and empire in the US. Jodi Melamed (2006) has argued:
In contrast to white supremacy, the liberal race paradigm recognizes racial inequality as a problem, and it secures a liberal symbolic framework for race reform centered in abstract equality, market individualism, and inclusive civic nationalism. Antiracism becomes a nationally recognized social value and, for the first time, gets absorbed into U.S. governmentality. Importantly, postwar liberal racial formation sutures an "official" antiracism to What is interesting about this article and others like it is that the evidence that Trump's labor policies are racist is the same evidence that suggests that the laborer as a figure, and human labor writ large, is vestigial to the tech-driven economy. To be clear, we are not contending that the nostalgic vision of the white working class in the US is disconnected from the logics of white supremacy. Rather, we are proposing that there is also an urgent need to parse out the racial logics that continue to structure the technoliberal imaginary which articulates itself as separate from white supremacy.
The fully automated future, it is important to note, is not unconditionally celebrated. It is often articulated as loss ─ just not as white loss, but rather as universal human loss. According to Stephen
Hawking, "The automation of factories has already decimated jobs in traditional manufacturing, and the rise of artificial intelligence is likely to extend this job destruction deep into the middle classes, with only the manufacturing is still flourishing in America. Problem is, factories don't need as many people as they used to because machines now do so much of the work. America has lost more than 7 million The PBS report concludes that the upside of the robot revolution is that the Asian drain of jobs is ending, as manufacturing returns to the US where the use of robots can be easily implemented as an affordable solution to outsourcing. In the technoliberal imaginary, US imperial power has thus been reaffirmed through technological innovation.
By way of conclusion, we want to return to the critique of technoliberalism that we see in the Mexico border wall satire video featuring Robo-Trump, with which we opened this paper. As we read it, the short film asserts the need to understand racialized labor as central to automation (not as separate from it, as in the technoliberal imaginary).
The film demonstrates that automation (or the expulsion of Mexican workers from the US ─ including doctors, beauty queens, meteorologists, and food truck chefs) is both violent and inefficient. The automated complaint system at the wall cannot do the work that a human could do, leading to a comical and purposeful miscommunication as the system thanks the angry food truck worker for his cooperation and asks him not to return. The film also insists that racialized labor is central to all aspects of the US economy, from the service industry to entertainment.
Even more significantly, the film can be read as making a connection between fascist and technoliberal futures. Trump (or at least we can 9 Atanasoski and Vora Catalyst: Feminism, Theory, Technoscience 4(1) assume the man is Trump, based on his hairstyle) is inside the giant killer robot who crosses the border wall to stomp on the expelled Mexican workers. That the body of Trump and the body of the robot act as one underscores the dual violence of automation and white supremacy. The film thus refuses to treat them as separate, as does technoliberalism. The film suggests that technoliberal imaginaries that utilize robots to frame antiracist arguments against the logic of walls are violent in their own way.
As we well know, new technologies of automation have historically often provided the rationale for actually ramping up production and the need for more workers whose labor has been devalued due to automation, for instance in twentieth century agribusiness (Marez 2016 Herzig and Subramaniam (2017) argue that the "very assertion of a subject's ability to labor, like assertions of capacities for reason, suffering, or language, often serves as a tool for delineating hierarchical boundaries of social and political concern" (p. 104). In other words, only certain kinds of subjects (and certain kinds of work), following orthodox Marxist conceptual rubrics, could be legible as "labor," while other kinds of work (for example, women's reproductive labor or nonhuman, including animal work) fall away from that category. Affirming that we must account for these unnamed or unrecogized laboring subjects under biocapital (including nonagential, nonhuman, nonliving, and metaphysical labor), they call upon "radical scholars' further reflection on the labor concept's myriad entanglements with exclusionary categories of race, nation, gender, sexuality, disability, and species, while reaffirming the Atanasoski and Vora Catalyst: Feminism, Theory, Technoscience 4(1) significance of "labor"" (p. 104) as a category of analysis. While class is still very much a part of the analysis, Subramaniam's and Herzig's point is that because of the over-privileging of the white blue-collar worker, other categories entangled with labor fall away. Instead, as they insist, these other categories must be thought alongside class in order to recast the stakes of who (or what) can be made legible as a laboring subject. Such an analysis would also open up new possibilities for thinking through the racialization of the white underclass (and/as failed whiteness, "white trash," etc.) (Hartigan 1997 ).
Because of the technoliberal insistence that we are entering a post-labor world that is anti-racist because it is human-free, it is urgent to assess the ways in which technology has innovated upon capital's dependence on racialized and gendered labor. As we have argued here, a post-race world forecasted by tech industry icons and leaders asserts a universal humanity, thus rendering racialized labor invisible. As automation ostensibly "frees" humans from the drudgery of manual labor for more creative and innovative work (Atanasoski and Vora 2015) , the people who get those creative jobs will be those representing the whiteness of how such skills are embodied (e.g., attendance at a liberal arts college or those who have experienced certain class privileges).
Because, as we have pointed out, technoliberals cite automation, rather than immigration, as the main threat to the US worker, this occurs ironically though opposition to policies of exclusion, expulsion, and overtly racist discourse, even as the privileges of whiteness are reasserted. It is thus urgent to pay attention to the connections between the post-racial and post-labor logics of liberalism today even as we appear to be in an era ruled by the logics of fascism ─ the two, we suggest, are never disconnected.
